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Cyber espionage is an increasingly
pertinent topic of attention in UK
news, amongst security
researchers, and within intelligence
communities. Historically, spaces
like Bletchley Park have framed
intelligence and counterintelligence
operations as interdisciplinary
activities, and this is a perspective
that was echoed by our cyber
espionage conference at University
of Oxford. 
 
The 5th annual conference was
organised and run by a committee
of Oxford and Royal Holloway
doctoral researchers studying at
EPSRC Centres for Doctoral
Training, all of whom come from
different discipline backgrounds, but
were inspired to come together with
the aim of contributing to a better
cyber security future for the UK. 
 
 
 
As adversaries with evolving
technological toolkits continue to
mount novel attacks to undermine
UK's security, surveying current
cyber espionage capabilities has
potentially never been more
pressing. 
 
This report on the event summarises
each speaker’s conference
presentation*, and is intended to
contribute to a discussion about UK
security and also the international
discussion on how cyber security and
cyber espionage will advance in the
21st century. 
 
 
Why Cyber Espionage?
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*Each talk is the editors’ summary and may not represent the totality of each speaker’s point of view
  
 
The triad of universities, security (military)
forces, and intelligence communities form
a nexus of knowledge exchange that has
existed for decades. Gearon's
talk articulated the details of this
relationship, and drew on his forthcoming
publication  'The Routledge International
Handbook of Universities, Security and
Intelligence Studies'
 
Two individuals who have demonstrated
how these three worlds overlap, are:
Dwight Eisenhower, who served as Army
General in the US military, as 34th US
President, and as 13th President of
Columbia University; and former FBI
Director James Comey, the latter of whom
co-hosted an invite-only student cyber
security conference at Boston College in
2017
 
Security after World War Two expanded
from the domain of the military to
something now also studied and
conceptually contributed to by academics -
a phenomenon of militarisation, perhaps,
evidenced by the existence of our own
conference. 
 
The university campus is no stranger to
the world of espionage, a contemporary
example being foreign students 
 
 
'The Universities-Security-Intelligence Nexus': 
Liam Gearon, University of Oxford
“What Does Secret Knowledge Achieve?”
 
and foreign professors monitored by
intelligence communities for fear of
industrial or state espionage.
 
Universities are a complicit actor in the
intelligence-security apparatus. At
times, universities have been the
bedrock of anti-government critique, or
have cemented the power of
intelligence communities. Perceived as
liberal institutions, universities may 
 portray their relationship with
intelligence and security agencies as
somewhat more distant than what
Gearon would say is the reality. 
 
Collaborative research between these
spheres is important for securing
peace, but the role of the academic
must be viewed as tied to the security-
intelligence world. This realisation
comes with ethical issues, as the
knowledge shared by universities can
contribute to military activities that may
result in the death of adversaries and
possibly even civilians. 
 
Our first speaker set the stage for us to
consider what it means for us to be
security researchers, reminding us that
it is not a responsibility to be taken
lightly.
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Open source intelligence (OSINT)
communities are a different and less
well-established kind of intelligence
group. Healy emphasised the role of
OSINT in verifying the commitments
made by states to nuclear
nonproliferation, for example. OSINT
thus maintains an international
peacetime status quo that avoids kinetic
escalation (physical retaliation). 
 
There are several examples of civilian
OSINT being used to supplement state-
sanctioned cyber espionage, notably
Bellingcat’s unmasking of the GRU
operatives (allegedly) responsible for
the Skripal poisoning, but also situations
in which using publicly available satellite
imagery has facilitated the identification
of cases of Chinese industrial
espionage.
'Open Source Intelligence': 
Niamh Healy, Ridgeway Information
“Open Source Information is Potentially More Verifiable”
 
The use of OSINT to avoid states
having to call each other out for
international norms violations allows
civilians to do what was previously the
remit of media (to whom spies leaked
their findings). 
 
Now, OSINT communities can
corroborate each other’s work and
actively shape global relations, without
causing international tensions or
endangering human espionage
operatives. 
 
OSINT also highlights the imperative to
approach intelligence gathering from a
variety of cultural and linguistic
perspectives. The ability to translate
information from and into various
languages is an asset to all intelligence
communities; it is a telling geopolitical
picture that GCHQ advertise jobs for
speakers of Russian, Farsi, Mandarin,
and Arabic.
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The spectres of China, Russia and
North Korea loomed large during
Carolina’s talk. 
 
Cyber espionage is simply defined, with
influence from NATO’s Tallinn Manual,
as 'information gathering via cyber
capacities'. Cyber espionage as a tool is
indispensable, as it gives adversaries a
cheap method to gather large amounts
of data and influence other states, all
without fear of potential reprisal as the
veil of anonymity can obfuscate actions
and identity.
 
Legally, ‘cyberspace’ does not exist.
International law is such that cyber
operations and espionage can violate
the sovereignty of a State, and
prosecution and penalties are both
dependent on the physical location of
the attackers and their targets.
 
However, attribution of adversaries’
activities is hard, and the
question becomes how one can legally
designate the responsibility of an action.
Is a State ‘responsible’ if one of its
citizen carries out a cyber operation
against another State?
'Cyber Espionage in Law and Policy':
Robert Carolina, Royal Holloway, University of London
“Cyber Espionage is a New Tool in an Old Game”
 
Yes, the State is able to convict the
attacker under their own domestic
laws, but the State that houses this
individual is not necessarily seen as a
complicit actor.
 
A non-state actor’s cyber-operation,
when directed by the State, can
become attributable to the State, and
therefore are an issue for international
law. Cyber attacks are prohibited by
international law: one cannot injure a
person or damage objects via a cyber
operation. Still, cyber espionage, per
se, is not actually a violation of
international law, but the methods for
conducting cyber espionage may
violate laws and agreements.  
 
Although espionage has existed for
centuries, the prefix of ‘cyber’
multiplies the complexities that the UK
must navigate in the 21st century if we
are to withstand adversaries’
information-gathering attempts, and
launch our own.
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Security threats are usually
conceptualised by most to be at State-
level. Tanczer highlighted that some
cyber security threats are on the scale
of the household, but are still very much
existential. 
 
A very different notion of ‘cyber security’
is enacted, whereby devices and the
control over them are used to
undermine an individual’s privacy and
security on a daily basis. This is
‘technology-facilitated abuse’. As the
Internet of Things (IoT) expands, an
increasing number of devices in our
home and on our body will convey
instantaneous data. 
 
These devices can be weaponised by
anyone to facilitate surveillance, control,
and abuse. Tanczer stated that this
abuse is highly gendered, with the
purchase, set-up, and maintenance of
domestic technologies often carried out
by men, leaving women in situations
whereby their devices (and their lives)
are at the mercy of their partners.
 
We participated in a live experiment to
investigate the vast array of ‘spying’
apps. We found apps - sold as 
'Gender and IoT' 
Leonie Tanczer, University College London
“Intimate Espionage; Spying within the Home”
 
parental monitoring for children’s
phones, which is problematic in itself -
that could be downloaded to become a
digital panoptic surveillance system for
an abused person if downloaded onto
their phone by a partner. 
 
This app would give the controller
complete access to GPS location
information, call data, message
content, live listening capabilities, and
access to Internet history and picture
memory. 
 
Tanczer and her research partners run
workshops working with survivors of
such abuse and their social workers,
arming them with the information they
need to stay safe and to realise when
abuse is taking place. 
 
Ultimately, however, police services
and policymakers need to give
technology-facilitated abuse closer
attention, with a legal emphasis on
how taking control of devices can
contravene someone’s rights - even if
it is a partner committing this crime.
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This session was based around the
technical controls and tools that can be
used to implement different forms of
intelligence gathering from “inside the
system”.
 
For all its perks, the Information Age has
caused many issues for the signals
intelligence community as there is
simply too much data to be
comprehensively analysed. This
situation will only get worse - it is
speculated that by 2022 there will be
over 122 Exabytes of data
communicated over the Internet per
month.
 
In addition to this, the deployment of
cryptographic protocols across devices
at all layers of society makes
interception and analysis of electronic
communications more difficult.
 
Wolthusen suggested that to negate
this, intelligence agencies (and
wannabe spies) are resorting to
compromising devices at a hardware
level or network level, where less
verification occurs.Spying in this manner
can have the benefit of not interfering
with the target, which for some industrial
systems is vital.
 
 
'Cyber Intelligence and Offensive Operations'
Stephen Wolthusen, Royal Holloway, University of London
“From Port to Porch”
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There is also the benefit of additional
contextual information by eavesdropping
at the endpoints of the communication
versus intercepting messages in transit.
 
This is often enacted through supply
chain attacks. Indeed, most hardware
developers have been forced to
outsource the production of the
hardware to a third party due to the
exorbitant costs of manufacture. This
immediately places control of the supply
chain and verification of hardware with
an external organisation, which may not
be ideal. 
 
This risk is well-known; the NSA
produced their own computer chips at
Fort Meadle to prevent this sort of
attack. However, the economic and
market factors associated with such a
decision ultimately prevented this from
being a viable long-term strategy. 
 
Suggested solutions include verification
of computer systems at all levels, built
around secure tools and services. This
is especially important due to the
incredible difficulty of verifying
components at circuit-level.
 
  
 
For all of the theory discussed so far,
cyber espionage is still a new and
changing field. Pickard highlighted that,
for British intelligence agencies, intent is
key -  namely, 'why is the operation
being carried out?' The associated
costs, qualities, and results are all
important aspects to consider when
deciding which counterespionage
approach to deploy. 
 
The contrast between human
intelligence and signals intelligence was
also discussed at length - both in terms
of personnel that are needed to carry
out the operations, but also in terms of
the information that is to be extracted. 
 
Cyber security uniquely sits between
these two realms - as opposed to
traditional signals intelligence (which is
mostly passive) and to human
intelligence (which can be very direct).
Ultimately, however, cyber espionage
must be used carefully due to the
plethora of data available and the lack of
resources that so often characterises
cyber operations. 
 
'Operational considerations'
David Pickard, Independent security researcher
“The Reality of Cyber Espionage”
 
Public perception of cyber capabilities
can also impact the choices on when
and how to use certain cyber espionage
techniques - as is often the case, they
may be widely perceived positively or
negatively, depending on the scenario
and current affairs.
 
In addition, Pickard mentioned the
difficulty of cross-border information
sharing. The tension between the
increasing internationalisation of
intelligence and data protection
regulation can cause conflict while
conducting effective and safe espionage
operations. 
 
Even in our domestic setting, Pickard
highlighted how UK legislation restrains
and guides the behaviour of members of
our intelligence agencies. The politics of
a warrant request and warrant-signing,
for example, were mentioned as crucial
for keeping surveillance at an ethical
level - preventing undemocractic mass
‘surveillance’. 
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 The goal of this session was to allow doctoral students to discuss relevant
topics of interest
 
To begin, Amy Ertan informed the audience about the lack of consensus
surrounding the term “algorithmic warfare” in current research literature. 
 
Following this, Freddie Barr-Smith discussed the art of penetration testing
and using it to assess aspects of an organization’s security policy and
culture. 
 
Dray Agha then examined how information and territory are utilised and
weaponised in contemporary Russian military doctrine. 
 
Finally, Fatima Zahrah and Julia Slupska detailed their systematic
approach of applying the “pathetic red dot theory” to the issue of tech-
facilitated domestic abuse.
CDT PhD Students' Lightning Talks
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 One theme that influenced all of the
talks was the rule of law: how the
stipulations of legislation and
regulation determine what actions
institutions can and cannot
undertake; how policy and
policymakers with a global outlook
have inherited a mosaic of national
laws that conflict and run parallel to
one another; how these issues make
international legal collaboration
difficult between States; and also
how government policy needs input
from industry and academia. 
 
The UK, and its allies, are currently
grappling with whose technology
they can trust: the concerns over
Huawei, and if they are an honest
global telecommunications
corporation, or a mechanism for the
Chinese state to commit cyber
espionage on a global scale. The
potential for an adversary to have
unhindered access to
telecommunications is a grave threat
worth investigating by all disciplines
and communities. 
 
Summary
 
Now, more than ever, research is
needed to inform policymakers'
decisions on what and whose
technologies should be legislated
for and against. Research is needed
into how technology can be
exploited in unexpected ways,
making material threats that could
not have been conceived. Research
is also needed in the 'attribution'
problem, to better discern who
exactly the adversary of a cyber
operation is, so they can face legal
and economic repercussion.
 
Research in espionage is difficult,
given that much remains privy to
government institutions only. But
difficult is not impossible. It is up to
us all to proactively contribute to our
nation’s security and to foster
international relations to guarantee
that future policies and laws will be
crafted within the context of a global
community centred around the
values of freedom, democracy, and
equality.
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